

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**THE 1993 OFFSITE AGREEMENT: UNDERMINING GOLDWATER-NICHOLS AND  
SPECIAL FORCES CAPABILITIES**

by

Colonel Raphael Semmes Duckworth  
United States Army Reserve

Dr. Douglas V. Johnson II  
Project Adviser

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U.S. Army War College  
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

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## **ABSTRACT**

AUTHOR: Colonel Raphael Semmes Duckworth

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Following the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, the fall of the Soviet Union, and the end of the Cold War, Secretary of Defense Cheney acknowledged the requirement to reduce the DoD budget and to downsize the military. This began in earnest when Secretary of Defense Aspin directed the services to conduct a "Bottom Up Review" to determine the force necessary to fight two Major Regional Conflicts simultaneously. In addition Secretary Aspin directed that the active Army be reduced by 20,000 below the BUR baseline and the Reserve Components below the "Offsite Agreement" levels. Seven years later the events of 9/11 issued in from the realm of uncertainty. What existed prior to 9/11 and continues today is an unusual relationship between the U.S. Army Special Forces Command and the Army National Guard Special Forces in the face of the Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act and the Nunn-Cohen Amendment. This research reveals the dysfunctional consequences of those acts upon the Army National Guard Special Operating Forces and attempts to define the proper roles and scope in which they should operate. Recommendations are provided to correct command deficiencies and logically align forces within the appropriate components of the Army Reserve and National Guard.



## THE 1993 OFFSITE AGREEMENT: UNDERMINING GOLDWATER-NICHOLS AND SPECIAL FORCES CAPABILITIES

### Background

Following the attacks of 11 September 2001 the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) immediately recognized that the United States was in a state of asymmetric war and that Special Forces would take the lead. Planning began immediately. The Global War on Terrorism commenced with covert infiltration of several Special Forces Operational Detachments "A" (SFODA) into Afghanistan on 7 October 2001. The Northern Alliance, recruited, trained and guided by SFODAs, successfully defeated the Taliban forcing Usama bin Laden and members of al Qaeda into the mountains along the Pakistan border. America and its allies expanded the war on terrorism into Iraq on 20 March 2003 to deny terrorists a safe haven and/or assistance from Saddam Hussein. United States Special Operations Forces (SOF) and their associated skills were and presently remain in great demand to combat terrorism. For the first time in its history the United States Army Special Forces Command (Airborne) (USASFC(A)) was simultaneously conducting its five stated missions: Foreign Internal Defense, Unconventional Warfare, Direct Action, Special Reconnaissance, and Counter-Terrorism. It was known at USASOC, USASFC(A), and readily apparent to others that this form of warfare would take years to fight thereby testing the American will and expending precious resources: time, money and people. Following the military drawdown in the 1990s, the Special Operations community had little in the way of people resources. Only seven years prior to that ominous day USASFC(A) was forced to eliminate its two Army Reserve Special Forces Groups, an action dictated by the Offsite Agreement of 1993. Ironically, one of these groups was oriented to Southwest Asia, the very theater that every U.S. Army Special Forces Group has deployed a considerable number of its members and will continue to do for years to come. America had never expected to commit a substantial amount of its forces, let alone its unconventional forces, to a region for an extended period of time to combat terrorism. War was not envisioned that way.

Despite the demands placed on the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), USASOC and USASFC(A) continue to provide their unique capabilities to the Central Command (CENTCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR) in both the Iraq and Afghanistan theater of operations. Every form of Special Operations skill and Human Intelligence capability is at a premium and the strain on these forces increases with every rotation. Special Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC), Special Operations Command South (SOCSOUTH) and Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR) each have contributed resources to Special

Operations Command Central (SOCCENT) efforts in combating terrorism and stemming the violence emanating from Southwest Asia. The demands of this war also require the use of the resources from the Army National Guard (ARNG) Special Forces Groups situated in nearly a dozen states across the United States. Though it is difficult to synchronize the use of the ARNG Special Forces assets situated in the several states, the Department of the Army (DA) and Forces Command (FORSCOM) have mobilized a number of Army National Guard Special Forces elements at the request of USASFC(A) to augment its ability to prosecute the war on terrorism. However, only once, in 2003, was a substantial number of the Army National Guard 20<sup>th</sup> Special Forces Group mobilized, trained and deployed as a group in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. From that point forward, ARNG Special Forces elements have been piecemealed into the CENTCOM AOR. Use of the ARNG for long-term mobilization and overseas deployments is limited by Partial Mobilization<sup>1</sup> rules coupled with access restrictions associated with the ARNG under the provisions of U.S. Code, Title 32. Use of the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) is similarly affected by the rules of Partial Mobilization; however, access is unlimited under the provisions of U.S. Code, Title 10.

The Department of the Army recognizes the need for increased access to the Reserve Components. “Support for the legislative authorities and programs [are] needed to assure access to our Reserve Components – who, by necessity, have become an operational vice strategic reserve.”<sup>2</sup> In the meantime, in a seemingly unorthodox process USASFC(A) must request the National Guard Bureau (NGB) and FORSCOM to mobilize and make accessible ARNG Special Forces units for employment. Essentially USASFC(A) is constrained by the law to gain access to its capabilities. For that reason, instead of USASFC(A) exercising command and control (C2) authority over the ARNG Special Forces Groups, the several state governors exercise C2 of ARNG forces within their respective states. U.S. Code Title 32 states “Each State or Territory and Puerto Rico may fix the location of the units and headquarters of its National Guard.<sup>3</sup> To secure a force, the units of which when combined will form complete higher tactical units, the President may designate the units of the National Guard, by branch of the Army or organization of the Air Force, to be maintained in each State and Territory, Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia. *However, no change in the branch, organization, or allotment of a unit located entirely within a State may be made without the approval of its governor*.<sup>4</sup> In simple terms, the state governor is the commander in chief of all ARNG forces in his state while they are in a Title 32 status. Additionally, the subordinate elements of an organization (i.e. battalions, companies, SFODAs are assigned to a state's troop command, regardless of branch, for command and control purposes. For example, an SFODA located in Maryland is assigned

to the Maryland Troop Command, not the company and battalion headquarters located in Mississippi. Likewise, the battalion located in Mississippi is assigned to the Mississippi Troop Command, not the group headquarters located in Alabama. Therefore, there is little or no group, battalion or company integrity existent within the ARNG Special Forces Groups. There are, however, exceptions with intrastate command relationships with those ARNG Special Forces elements that reside in the same state as their group and/or battalion headquarters. U.S. Code, Title 10 distinguishes between the two components in stating “The Army Reserve includes all Reserves of the Army *who are not members of the Army National Guard of the United States*.<sup>5</sup> Until the ARNG is mobilized into Title 10 status, the governor is the commander in chief of the state’s forces and the chain of command remains within state borders.

This seems to betray the spirit of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 giving rise to the question: “Why are Special Forces Groups, battalions, SFODAs and their support elements’ unique capabilities nested in the Army National Guard?” Unified (functional) Commands, like USSOCOM, were organized and established in accordance with the mandates of Goldwater-Nichols to reduce service power and influence. “The overarching concern [of Goldwater-Nichols] focused on the excessive power and influence of the four services, which had precluded the integration of their separate capabilities for effective joint war fighting.”<sup>6</sup> But one must also consider the complexities and detractors involved with multi-component training associated with the ARNG, Title 32 forces, which may inhibit effective war fighting. In its decision to retain ARNG Special Forces Groups, I assumed that the Department of the Army overlooked or disregarded state political influence in implementing Goldwater-Nichols. This study will determine if the decision reached by the Offsite Agreement of 1993 in retaining ARNG vice USAR Special Forces Groups was in violation of the Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986, and will reveal the limitations this decision placed on USASOC and USASFC(A). It will also recommend the proper roles of and balance between the USAR and the ARNG Special Operations Forces.

### History

Special or partisan forces have always had a purpose in war yet they have sought formal recognition within in an army’s organization. Throughout American military history ad hoc and formally organized specialized units can be found, each possessed of distinctive capabilities, and conducting unique operations establishing their purpose and worth. U.S. Special Forces draws its lineage back to America’s Revolutionary War identifying its roots with Brigadier

General Francis Marion, the “Swamp Fox”, and his application of irregular or unconventional approach to warfare. General Marion’s partisan operations against Major General Lord Charles Cornwallis were instrumental in disrupting Cornwallis’ operations and led indirectly to that British commander’s surrender. The illustrious line continues through the American Civil War where Colonel John Singleton Mosby introduced his type of partisan warfare into Northern Virginia effectively disrupting Union operations in that sector. Colonel Mosby successfully interdicted lines of communication, conducted direct action missions, performed long range reconnaissance and captured high profile Union officers thereby increasing Southern morale and resolve. Colonel Mosby’s 43<sup>rd</sup> Virginia Cavalry Regiment was the only Southern unit that did not surrender at the end of hostilities signifying its independent yet integrated capability. During World War II the 1<sup>st</sup> Special Services Force, a joint American-Canadian unit known as “The Devil’s Brigade,” was activated on 9 July 1942. As the first formally recognized Special Operations organization in the American military, its purpose was to carry the offensive to the Germans. The need for such forces was duly cited by Sir Winston Churchill who saw value in this type warfare commenting that “enterprises must be prepared, with specially trained troops of the hunter class, who can develop a reign of terror...leaving a trail of German corpses behind them.” The 1<sup>st</sup> Special Services Force distinguished itself in campaigns throughout Italy creating their air of mystery at the Battle of Anzio. It was later disbanded on 6 January 1945 at Menton, France. A parallel lineage of Special Forces traces back to the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) under the command of Brigadier General William O. “Wild Bill” Donovan in 1942.<sup>7</sup> In France small elements of the OSS called “Jedburgh Teams” were employed to assist the allied landings and subsequent breakouts at both Normandy and Provence.<sup>8</sup> One such Jedburgh Team was led by Colonel Aaron Bank, who later became the first commander of the 10<sup>th</sup> Special Forces Group.<sup>9</sup>

The concept of Special Forces remained alive in the post-war years, due to the efforts of several veterans of unconventional warfare in World War II, among them Colonel Bank.<sup>10</sup> On 11 June 1952 the U.S. Army created the 10<sup>th</sup> Special Forces Group to conduct partisan warfare behind Red Army lines in the event of a Soviet invasion of Europe.<sup>11</sup> 10<sup>th</sup> Special Forces Group later split up with one half forward deployed to Flint Kaserne, Bad Tolz, Germany while the other remained at Fort Bragg, North Carolina re-designated the 77<sup>th</sup> Special Forces Group. The 77<sup>th</sup> Special Forces Group would form the nucleus of the present day 7<sup>th</sup> Special Forces Group. In the early 1960s America’s involvement in Vietnam saw the creation and activation of nine additional Special Forces Groups, including units in the U.S. Army Reserve and Army National Guard. Like their predecessors, Army Special Forces units and soldiers distinguished

themselves in the jungles of Vietnam. Special Forces had entered the Army stage as a viable force possessing unique skills and capabilities that would be in demand for present and future threats. However, within ten years concurrent with the redeployment of forces from Vietnam four Active Component Special Forces Groups would be inactivated leaving three Active Component (5<sup>th</sup>, 7<sup>th</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup>) , two USAR (11<sup>th</sup> and 12<sup>th</sup>) and two ARNG (19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup>) Special Forces Groups remaining. Ostensibly the Active Component Special Forces Groups were assigned to the 18<sup>th</sup> Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg, North Carolina; a somewhat awkward relationship since they were not like-type forces and 18<sup>th</sup> Airborne Corps rarely considered these type forces in their planning. The Reserve Component Special Forces Groups were assigned to their respective components. With the unforeseeable end to the Cold War, the arrival of the Reagan Administration and the uncertainty of Soviet intentions, the 1<sup>st</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> Special Forces Groups were re-activated to provide global and theater flexibility to combat the spread of communism. The Special Operations community enjoyed enormous growth and implemented substantial organizational change with the passing the 1987 Nunn-Cohen Amendment<sup>12</sup> to the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act. All this changed with Soviet reform and the introduction of perestroika.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the communist threat seemingly dissipating, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney recognized the need to reduce the Department of Defense budget and downsize the military. USSOCOM and USASOC began identifying Special Operations units for inactivation. Among them were the 11<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> Special Forces Groups, USAR and ARNG respectively, with a target inactivation date of 14 September 1994. Major General Harley C. Davis, then Commanding General, USASFC(A) (1991-94) fervently attempted to save all Special Forces units from inactivation regardless of component. He was keenly aware of the vast recruiting campaign USASFC(A) had undertaken, the amount of time involved in training these soldiers to acquire the requisite Special Forces skills and the time required to build cohesive SFODAs as new members were assigned. Highly trained Special Forces soldiers, cohesive SFODAs and independently effective Special Forces companies and battalions are not created overnight. Major General Davis also understood the future threat. In a September 2001 briefing paper submitted to Congress, Brian J. Boquist recognized Major General Davis' foresight stating "less than a decade ago, MG Harley Davis pressed hard for U.S. Special Operations Forces to maintain regional and cultural orientation so to focus on unconventional war as a basis to respond to the 21st Century threat".<sup>13</sup> Hindsight notwithstanding, the 11<sup>th</sup> and 12<sup>th</sup> Special Forces Groups were ultimately inactivated leaving Major General Davis as the sole champion to spare his USAR Special Forces Groups. Why the

change from 19<sup>th</sup> to 12<sup>th</sup> Special Forces Group? It can be assumed that the inactivation of the two Army Reserve groups was in keeping with the Offsite Agreement of 1993. Interestingly though, in June 1994 at the 19<sup>th</sup> Special Forces Group Yearly Training Conference Brigadier General Michael W. Davidson, USASOC Deputy Commanding General for National Guard Affairs, announced to the group, “it came down to two hours and twelve telephone calls to save you guys” from inactivation.<sup>14</sup> The implication here is the powerful political influence the state governors, the ARNG and the NGB wield in the halls of the U.S. Congress.

Effective 14 September 1994 the 11<sup>th</sup> and 12<sup>th</sup> Special Forces Groups were inactivated in accordance with the terms of the Offsite Agreement of 1993<sup>15</sup> representing nearly 30 percent of the Title 10 forces assigned to USASFC(A). As a consequence EUCOM and CENTCOM lost half of their committed Special Forces capability, 11<sup>th</sup> and 12<sup>th</sup> Special Forces Groups respectively. USASFC(A) lost half of its Reserve Component Special Forces strength and that which remained belonged to the ARNG and the several states. Though USASFC(A) exercises no command and control authority over the ARNG Special Forces Groups, it does exercise “Training Oversight” - a term devised to define the formal relationship between USASFC(A) and the ARNG. Training Oversight stipulates that Special Forces training, doctrine and standards as set forth by the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS) will be adhered to by ARNG Special Forces units and soldiers during peace and war. Hence, this arrangement requires close supervision on USASFC(A)’s part since there is no unity of command within the ARNG Special Forces Groups to ensure adherence to Special Forces standards and training. This created considerable consternation among senior active Army Special Forces officers and non-commissioned officers who were unfamiliar with the law under U.S Code, Title 32. Characteristically, these same leaders sought to overcome this command relationship dilemma with little or no success. This placed enormous constraints on USASFC(A)’s ability to provide highly trained Special Forces units and soldiers to the Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCC), much less their ability to respond effectively to any emergency or contingency. Short of a declaration of war, it is difficult to mobilize ARNG Special Forces units and soldiers given the nature of state politics and interests. For example, in 1994 during Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti, USASFC(A) quickly realized that it was difficult to partially mobilize a fully qualified ARNG Special Forces unit. The reasons were fourfold: 1) USASOC and USASFC(A) have no authority to mobilize ARNG units; 2) American foreign policy may not be politically expedient to the state<sup>16</sup>; 3) lack of company, battalion or group integrity restricted by state boundaries; and 4) low percentage of Special Forces qualification within ARNG ranks causing FORSCOM to cross-level National Guardsmen from

one state to another. This lack of Special Forces qualification within a given ARNG unit is a systemic problem for at least three reasons. First, as mentioned before, there is no unity of command within an ARNG Special Forces Group to monitor and mandate individual and collective training<sup>17</sup>. Second, the state leadership is not aware of or receptive to what is required to recruit, train and equip Special Forces soldiers and units. And third, there is no synchronization between the several states to consolidate forces during peacetime. In the end USASFC(A) was forced to piece together ARNG Special Forces volunteers from the several states to field one or two companies including SFODAs for one deployment; a small return on such a large investment.

This brings into question not only the logic of the Offsite Agreement but also the forces that implemented that decision. Regrettably Reserve Component culture and politics coupled with Active Component indifference toward the Reserve Components would ultimately decide the outcome. Were the mandates of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act ignored? Did the decisions of the Offsite Agreement fueled by the findings of Bottom Up Review trump Goldwater-Nichols in some fashion? In order to proceed we need to take a basic look at each of these policies in an attempt to determine the answers to these questions.

#### Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986

With its desire to create a more appropriate balance between joint and service interests as a backdrop, Congress declared eight purposes for the act:

- To reorganize DOD and strengthen civilian authority.
- To improve the military advice provided to the President, National Security Council, and Secretary of Defense.
- To place clear responsibility on the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands for the accomplishment of missions assigned to those commands.
- To ensure that the authority of commanders of unified and specified combatant commands is fully commensurate with the responsibility of those commanders for the accomplishment of missions assigned to those commands.
- To increase attention to strategy formulation and contingency planning.
- To provide for the more efficient use of defense resources.
- To improve joint officer management policies.
- Otherwise to enhance the effectiveness of military operations and improve DOD management and administration.<sup>18</sup>

The main objective of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 was to reinforce civilian authority over the military, increase unified and specified combatant command responsibility and authority and to create and foster a joint mindset and culture within the Department of Defense. The services' organizational and institutional cultures often impeded attempts to integrate service-similar capabilities for effective joint war fighting. For years the separate services enjoyed immense power and influence in the Department of Defense. This control was based primarily on their leadership, their unique capabilities they brought to the fight and the services unwillingness to relinquish operational functions to a joint system.<sup>19</sup> This power was spawned and cultivated as the services established themselves throughout American history yet it grew extensively during World War II and the years that followed. This service competitiveness was viewed by many as counterproductive, duplicative in capabilities and self serving. An attempt at solving this problem was the signing into law the National Security Act of 1947, mandating a major reorganization of the foreign policy and military establishments of the U.S. Government.<sup>20</sup> However, the National Security Act of 1947 resulted in what President Eisenhower described as "little more than a weak confederation of sovereign military units."<sup>21</sup> What followed were a series of amendments in 1949, 1953 and 1958 to reorganize the membership of the National Security Council (NSC) and realign functions and responsibilities within the NSC<sup>22</sup>. As part of the 1958 amendments, the President and Congress approved the bifurcation of [the Department of Defense] into administrative and operational chains of command.<sup>23</sup> With Goldwater-Nichols, Congress again tried to realize the legislative model that emerged in 1958.<sup>24</sup> Further reorganization continued within DoD with the establishment of unified commands including the United States Special Operations Command.

Indeed, the requirement to establish USSOCOM was born out of the dictates of the 1987 Nunn-Cohen Amendment<sup>25</sup> of the Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986. USSOCOM's mission is to "support the geographic [Combatant Commanders], ambassadors and their country teams, and other government agencies by preparing Special Operations Forces (SOF) to successfully conduct special operations, including [Civil Affairs] and [Psychological Operations]".<sup>26</sup> USSOCOM, one of nine unified commands in the US military's combatant command structure, is composed of Army, Navy, and Air Force SOF.<sup>27</sup> On 1 December 1990 USASOC was activated as the 16th Major Army Command (MACOM). USASOC's mission is to "organize, train, educate, man, equip, fund, administer, mobilize, deploy and sustain Army Special Operations forces to successfully conduct worldwide special operations, across the range of military operations, in support of regional combatant commanders, American ambassadors and other agencies as directed."<sup>28</sup> The Nunn-Cohen

Amendment mandated that all Special Operations Forces (SOF) from all the services fall under the command and control of USSOCOM; with regards to the Army, USASOC exercised operational command and control of Army SOF, including Army Reserve Special Forces Groups, Civil Affairs Commands, and Psychological Operations Groups as Title 10 forces. This change in operational command and control would introduce Army Reserve SOF to a new organizational culture: the Active Army SOF. This was not only logical, but desired by Army Reserve SOF; however, they initially experienced “out-group” relationships with their active component counterparts. It was a matter of overcoming component stereotypes and gaining mutual respect but eventually Army Reserve SOF proved their worth and was accepted within short order. It is important to state here that Goldwater-Nichols and the Nunn-Cohen Amendment did not apply to the ARNG Special Forces Groups or any ARNG Special Operations aviation units. ARNG SOF elements remained under the command and control of their respective state governors. To organize its Army Reserve SOF, USASOC established the 1st SOCOM Augmentation Detachment, later called the U.S. Army Reserve Special Operations Command, to provide command, control and day-to-day administrative support for all of its Army Reserve Special Operations units: 11,500 Soldiers. This proved enormously successful given its simplicity and logic. It requires noting here that USSOCOM’s capability and global reach was further expanded and enhanced on 24 February 2006 by the activation of the Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC).

The Honorable James R. Locher III, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, wrote a comprehensive review on the Goldwater-Nichols Act entitled *The Goldwater-Nichols Act Ten Years Later*. Referring to the “clear responsibility” purpose of the eight purposes outlined above, Locher states “the act prescribed the chain of command as running from the President to the Secretary to the CINC (referring to the unified and specified combatant commanders).”<sup>29</sup> Locher further states “opinion is universal that this objective of Goldwater-Nichols has been achieved”.<sup>30</sup> True, Goldwater-Nichols’ landmark success achieved its objective of placing clear responsibility on the combatant commanders thereby simplifying their operational chains of command and enhancing their ability to fight and win the nation’s wars. General Norman Schwarzkopf commented that “Goldwater-Nichols established very, very clear lines of command authority and responsibilities over subordinate commanders, and that meant a much more effective fighting force.”<sup>31</sup> No questions exist on the “lines of command authority” between the active Army and USAR forces, but no “lines of command authority” exist between the active Army and ARNG forces until they are mobilized and assigned to the unified command during wartime. Hence, USSOCOM’s line of command

authority over the ARNG Special Forces Groups stops at the boundary between USASFC(A) and the several states.

In his review of Goldwater-Nichols with regard to the “commensurate authority” purpose, Locher stated that:

Congress found the combatant commands to be weak and unified in name only.<sup>32</sup> To correct this violation of command principles, Congress specified command authority to the CINCs.<sup>33</sup> The Goldwater-Nichols Act addressed the command functions of giving authoritative direction, prescribing the chain of command, organizing commands and forces, employing forces, assigning command functions to subordinate commanders, coordinating and approving aspects of administration and support, selecting and suspending subordinates, and convening courts-martial.<sup>34</sup> It is now widely agreed that Goldwater-Nichols has achieved its objective of balancing the authority and responsibility of the combatant commanders.<sup>35</sup>

The Nunn-Cohen Amendment took Goldwater-Nichols a step further and both have produced enormous success by defining and directing combatant commands’ authorities, command responsibilities and command functions with a view toward creating and instilling a joint culture within the Department of Defense and more specifically the Special Operations community. Goldwater-Nichols and Nunn-Cohen were the right solutions to bring Special Operations functions under one umbrella, namely USSOCOM. This is especially beneficial to the Special Operations soldiers in the field deployed around the globe during wartime; but what of USSOCOM’s “commensurate authority” during peacetime? USSOCOM, or any other unified combatant command, USASOC, as the Major Army Command (MACOM) for Special Operations, or USASFC(A) as the Major Subordinate Command (MSC) for Special Forces, does not exercise “commensurate authority” over the ARNG Special Forces Groups in peacetime.

The fact remains that because of Title 32 USSOCOM, USASOC and USASFC(A) can not exercise “clear responsibility” and “commensurate authority” over the ARNG Special Forces Groups except during wartime. Other prime purposes of Goldwater-Nichols are adversely impacted as well. Joint officer management is impeded by Title 32 in that ARNG officers can not leave their state borders unless converted to NGB Title 10 status. NGB Title 10 billets are limited and strictly controlled by the NGB in the Pentagon. With no “commensurate authority” over the ARNG Special Forces Groups, effectiveness of military operations and DoD management and administration is degraded. These are the responsibilities and functions of the states and serve the prerogative of the state governors at their discretion. This lack of “clear responsibility” and “commensurate authority” within the Special Operations community is not in agreement with the vision and intent of Goldwater-Nichols or the Nunn-Cohen Amendment.

Regardless, ARNG Special Forces Groups, Title 32 forces, will remain under the command authority of the states in which they reside. It is the combination of the law and the decision of the Offsite Agreement of 1993 that nullifies the intent of Goldwater-Nichols and Nunn-Cohen. The Offsite Agreement occurred in response to the Bottom Up Review.

The purpose of the Bottom-Up Review was to define the strategy, force structure, modernization programs, industrial base, and infrastructure needed to meet new dangers and seize new opportunities.<sup>36</sup> Essentially, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin wanted to reduce and redesign the force with sufficient capabilities to fight two Major Regional Conflicts (MRC) simultaneously. The base force prescribed in the Bottom Up Review<sup>37</sup> was to fight these two MRCs in a Win-Hold-Win strategy, that is to say to win in one MRC while holding in the second followed by winning in the second MRC once the first victory was accomplished. Surprisingly, Secretary Aspin directed that the active army reduce an additional 20,000 below base force levels prescribed in the Bottom Up Review receiving criticism for reducing the force below the Bush 41 Administration numbers. The defense budget would reflect a similar reduction; in fact the defense budget was actually set before the Bottom Up Review began. Senator Sam Nunn said the under-funded defense program is heading for a "train wreck" and that "our US military forces are not capable of carrying out the tasks assumed in the Bottom Up Review with this kind of eroding defense budget".<sup>38</sup> Throughout the decade the Clinton Administration would be consumed with the imbalance between downsizing the military and the defense budget while increasing the number of deployments compared to previous administrations combined. Title 10 Special Forces (Active and Reserve) were drastically downsized by nearly 30 percent shifting substantial geographic responsibility and coverage to the remaining active groups. Title 32 (National Guard) Special Forces Groups were parsed out by battalion and company to GCCs as mission and contingencies dictated to offset shortages. Ironically, almost amusingly, USASFC(A) submitted an initiative in 2003 to increase each active Special Forces Group by one battalion by 2015. This is nearly equivalent to the two USAR Title 10 Special Forces Groups inactivated ten years earlier. All of this reorganization and restructuring within Special Forces was a direct result of the Bottom Up Review and Offsite Agreement decisions.

The Offsite Agreement fell in line with the Bottom Up Review mandating additional reductions in Reserve Component end strength<sup>39</sup>; however, it gained its notoriety by what was agreed upon between the United States Army Reserve Command (USARC) and the NGB. According to the [Offsite Agreement], a total of 127,300 positions [were] eliminated from the Reserve Components by FY 1999.<sup>40</sup> The Army Off-Site Agreement was worked out by senior leaders of the active Army, the Army National Guard, the U.S. Army Reserve, and the

associations representing each component's members.<sup>41</sup> This was the first time that the three components had worked together on a major restructuring initiative.<sup>42</sup> In addition to its traditional state and civil mission, the Guard generally would be oriented toward combat functions, and the Reserve would be generally oriented toward combat service support functions.<sup>43</sup> The two components began the process of transferring those capabilities to be completed within 18 months. This decision created frustration within USASFC(A) and a feeling of abandonment within the USAR Special Forces Groups as well as those USAR students attending school at USAJFKSWCS at the time. USASFC(A) would lose a considerable amount of its unique talent and capability it was charged to provide to the combatant commanders. The USAR Special Forces students felt betrayed and unable to influence the future of their military careers. With the elimination of their units, their desire was to remain within the Special Operations community though not necessarily in Special Forces, and most transferred to the U.S. Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC(A)). Some transferred to the ARNG Special Forces (if within proximity) while others transferred to the Individual Ready Reserve. The decision of the Offsite Agreement to transfer capabilities between the USAR and ARNG was the requirement to drawdown the post-Cold War military in accordance with and parallel to the Bottom Up Review.

#### Following a Precedent

Operational command and control of U.S. Army Reserve Special Operations forces has returned to the pre-Goldwater-Nichols era. On 16 May 2006, the Department of Army announced the Department of Defense-directed decision to realign Army Reserve Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations forces to the U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC).<sup>44</sup> On 23 May 2006 transfer of operational command and control of USACAPOC(A) from USASOC to USARC<sup>45</sup> took place constituting 97 percent of USASOC's Civil Affairs (CA) and Psychological Operations (PYSOP) capability. However, USASOC retains operational command and control of the Active Component CA and PSYOP forces. Additionally, USASOC will continue as the proponent for CA and PSYOP doctrine and training through USAJFKSWCS, as it should. This decision could, however, have an adverse impact on USACAPOC(A) readiness in three critical areas: manning, material, and funding. As with the USASFC(A) and the ARNG Special Forces Groups, this adversely impacts USSOCOM and USASOC's "clear responsibility" and "commensurate authority" and will retard its ability to provide trained and ready CA and PSYOP forces at a pace to which it was accustomed.

What led the Department of Defense to make this decision? It is possible that an office in the Pentagon may have asked what made Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations “special”. What highly specialized training do CA and PSYOP Soldiers go through and what skills do they possess that separates them from the rest of the Army? During and following World War II, the need for civil administration resulted in the establishment of military government units composed of Army Reservists who possessed [the] appropriate civilian skills to administer government services: water, sewer, transportation, police, fire, and other basic services.<sup>46</sup> During the Vietnam [War], Special Forces soldiers performed Civil Affairs missions. This effort to “win the hearts and minds” of the local people was hit and miss, however, due partly to the fact that civil administration expertise in the Army lay within Army Reserve.<sup>47</sup> The lessons learned from World War II and Vietnam, the confirmed uniqueness of the civilian skills resident in the Army Reserve required for Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations soldiers, and their mutually supporting roles and relationships with Special Forces resulted in their doctrinal marriage and co-location at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Special Forces, Civil Affairs, and Psychological Operations doctrinal development and training has been a fixture of USAJFKSWCS since 10 April 1952. Consequently, as with Army Special Forces Groups, these specialized forces experienced similar misunderstandings under the operational command and control of the 18<sup>th</sup> Airborne Corps. With the signing of the Goldwater-Nichols and the Nunn-Cohen Amendment signed into law, this organizational deficiency was corrected.

On 27 November 1990, U.S. Army Reserve Special Operations Command was redesignated as the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (Airborne) effectively establishing USASOC’s fourth MSC: a multi-component command. USACAPOC(A)’s mission is to “train, equip, validate and prepare Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations forces for worldwide support to regional combatant commanders, US Ambassadors, Country Teams and other agencies as directed.”<sup>48</sup> USACAPOC(A) has been successfully fulfilling its mission for over 15 years without intervention from USARC. In fact, as a functional command USACAPOC(A) has been performing magnificently in planning, preparing, mobilizing, training and deploying nearly all of its forces, active and reserve, for the Global War on Terrorism with little assistance from USASOC or USARC. General Bryan D. Brown, USSOCOM Commanding General, commented in a 7 June 2005 interview that “[t]he vast majority of CA and PSYOP forces...have performed superbly in direct support of other SOF and the many conventional units they assist. As reconstruction continues, their role in bringing about and achieving stability will remain important”.<sup>49</sup> So why was this transfer to USARC necessary? CA and PSYOP’s status as “special” is not in question. USASOC remains the proponent of CA and PSYOP

doctrine, combat development and institutional training. With regard to CA and PSYOP forces, USASOC only exercises command authority over the 4<sup>th</sup> Psychological Operations Group and the 95<sup>th</sup> Civil Affairs Brigade (provisional). The answer, however, still lies within the Army Reserve and USASOC.

In 1990, USASOC took command of all Army Active and Reserve SOF in compliance with Goldwater-Nichols, the Nunn-Cohen Amendment and USSOCOM directives with the intention to succeed as a multi-component MACOM; and it did. However, the added dimension of providing support to Army Reserve Soldiers was unique to USASOC. By unique I mean that Army Reserve policies and procedures were unknown and unfamiliar to USASOC support staffs. Both components had to accept and adapt to each others cultures. This implied that USASOC would have to learn a wide range of Army Reserve unique support responsibilities as it assumed its role as a multi-component MACOM. Personnel actions, operations and training, all manner of logistics and the funding associated with these actions were and are resourced through Army Reserve channels. Ensuring that administrative and operational requirements were met was formidable at first, but USASOC quickly adapted and overcame the myriad of obstacles with characteristic ingenuity. For Army Reserve SOF this meant they would have to maintain pace with active Army SOF tempo, fulfill USASOC Combat Training Center (CTC) commitments, integrate into USASOC Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) and were subject to USASOC policies and precedents just as if they too were on active duty - a tall order for citizen Soldiers who, by law, only had to serve 48 days a year, but they did it. USASOC has consistently met all its force package requirements since its inception over 15 years ago and set the standard as an integrated multi-component MACOM. Now USASOC must depend on USARC to ensure Army Reserve CA and PSYOP units and soldiers receive the quality support they have been accustomed to. This remains to be seen how well this will work in the midst of the larger DoD force transformation requirements.

Like the active Army, the Army Reserve has been going through transformation too; in some respects more pronounced. The Army Reserve is in the process of dismantling its Cold War structure and rebuilding it into a leaner, lighter force with less overhead. In 2002, LTG James R. Helmly, former USARC Commanding General and the Chief of the Army Reserve, directed that the Army Reserve establish functional commands that would be directly subordinate to USARC. This eliminated at least two layers of command thereby "flattening" the Army Reserve structure. "This move is enabling the Army [Reserve] to maximize the effectiveness of these forces by reducing the number of coordinating headquarters, enabling closer and more direct care for the Army Reserve Soldiers and family members assigned to

these units.<sup>50</sup> For instance, the Military Intelligence Reserve Command, activated 16 October 2004, established itself as a headquarters, assumed command and control of all Army Reserve Military Intelligence units, and mobilized and deployed Military Intelligence force packages in support of OEF/OIF all within a span of 12 months. Army Reserve-Medical Command accomplished this same task recently and eventually the entire Army Reserve will reorganize into functional commands. USACAPOC(A) is a multi-component functional command and, as stated earlier, has been performing this task magnificently. This concept aligns like-type units with like-type commands, reduces administrative confusion in accessing forces from the force pool, and enables the Army Reserve to respond quicker to Combatant Commanders' force requirements through USARC and Forces Command respectively. This organizational change within the Army Reserve aligns perfectly and in concert with the intent and spirit of Goldwater-Nichols and follows the logic of Nunn-Cohen. Is the risk and implication in reversing Nunn-Cohen by transferring USACAPOC(A) to USARC going to provide better support to these forces? Can USARC's support infrastructure provide the level expected with the addition of these forces?

Since the end of the Cold War USARC has struggled at times to provide equitable, quality support to every Army Reserve soldier. The Cold War legacy structure includes ten CONUS-based Regional Readiness Commands comprising the backbone of command, control and support provided to the entire Army Reserve force. Subordinate to this structure is a labyrinth of commands and area support groups created to fit the local and regional specific support requirements. USACAPOC(A) units and Soldiers will now compete within this realm in the midst of Army Reserve transformation. USACAPOC(A) manning, equipment acquisition, training readiness, operational preparedness, mobilization, deployment and funding, even SOF specific funding, associated with these requirements will indeed be effected now that they have left the USASOC umbrella. For example, requests for Army Reserve CA and PSYOP force packages will now flow through FORSCOM and USARC, an additional two levels of command similar to requests for ARNG Special Forces Groups which flow through FORSCOM and the NGB. In both cases USSOCOM and USASOC must request Reserve Component forces for mobilization through two layers of command outside the Special Operations chain of command. These are Army Reserve SOF that should remain and return to the USSOCOM umbrella in accordance with Goldwater-Nichols and the Nunn-Cohen amendment.

USASFC(A) can attest to this phenomenon based on experiences associated with the unorthodox relationship they have with the ARNG Special Forces Groups. Just as the responsibility for recruiting, training, equipping and the readiness of ARNG Special Forces units

and soldiers rests with the several states, the same responsibility toward USAR CA and PSYOP rests with USARC. How then can USASOC fulfill its mission responsibility “to organize, train, educate, man, equip, fund, administer, mobilize, deploy and sustain Army Special Operations forces,” specifically USAR SOF, through a surrogate command? This current arrangement may be a short-term, long-term or permanent solution to overcome present support challenges associated with frequent rotation prevalent in the war on terrorism. This could also be a step requiring further amendment of Goldwater-Nichols. Just as USASFC(A) did with the ARNG, USACAPOC(A) will need to adapt to satisfy institutional requirements within contending organizational cultures. They need to become familiar with USARC specific imperatives while maintaining their ties with CA and PSYOP doctrine and their role within USASOC. USASOC’s agreement to transfer USACAPOC(A) to USARC sends an interesting message giving rise to another equally interesting question. Are CA and PSYOP truly specialized fields and do these specialties belong in Special Operations? I contend they are special and unique as argued earlier and therefore belong in the Special Operations community.

#### Conclusion/Recommendation

To satisfy the requirements, purposes and intent of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act and the Nunn-Cohen Amendment, Reserve Component Special Forces must be in the USAR, namely Title 10. This will solve the “clear responsibility” and “commensurate authority” dilemma that has existed between USSOCOM, USASOC, USASFC(A) and the ARNG over the past 13 years. This holds true for the recent transfer of USACAPOC(A) from USASOC to USARC. However, discussion of whether CA and PSYOP are truly “special” continues. Leaving CA and PSYOP forces in the active Army and USAR satisfies Goldwater-Nichols and Nunn-Cohen. But consider entertaining the concept of placing CA and PSYOP in the National Guard, that is say in all three components. This opens limitless possibilities for support to Homeland Defense. The notion that CA and PSYOP capabilities may be better suited in all three components is an interesting concept. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), at the direction of Congress and the Department of Defense (DoD), recently concluded<sup>51</sup> that DoD should leverage the National Guard to form the backbone of regional Civil Support forces.<sup>52</sup> State governors and their constituents may be better served if CA and PSYOP are in the Army National Guard. In peacetime they would work for their own state governors, but in a crisis, they could mobilize, deploy and work for any governor in the region who has been attacked.<sup>53</sup> For a state governor and the Adjutant General to have CA and PSYOP capabilities at his/her disposal during and following a natural or manmade disaster

could mean greater efficiency and effectiveness in saving lives, maintaining order, and restoring public services. Though not in a domestic sense, both specialties were in fact created for and oriented toward that purpose. Additionally, the possibility of having at least one Civil Affairs battalion in each state or multiple units in a region would enhance not only the each governor's capability to address emergencies within their state but would increase USASOC's rotational flexibility as well. Recruitment and retention would be better served by the fact that soldiers would have a vested interest in the recovery of their state's infrastructure and services. One may argue that if CA and PSYOP are indeed SOF, realigning them to the ARNG may violate the dictates of Goldwater-Nichols too. But lessons learned from natural disasters such as Hurricane Katrina revealed that legislation and proper alignment of roles within the Reserve Components may require reconsideration if nothing more than to satisfy reality and logic. The CSIS study recommended the Guard and Reserve need to remain multi-mission capable, but with less emphasis on conventional campaigns.<sup>54</sup> In preparing for future missions, the Reserve Component should place more emphasis on irregular warfare and homeland defense and civil support.<sup>55</sup> To fulfill this recommendation and satisfy the tenets of Goldwater-Nichols and Nunn-Cohen, I submit the proper Reserve Component for Special Forces (irregular warfare) is the Army Reserve and that Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations be placed in all three components for greater flexibility to meet any foreign or domestic threat.

The theme here has been an attempt to reinforce the spirit of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act and the Nunn-Cohen Amendment and their purpose of creating USSOCOM, USASOC, USASFC(A) and USACAPOC(A) to perpetuate its charter. Goldwater-Nichols was correct and clear in properly placing responsibility on and authority in the unified and specified combatant commands. The decisions of the Offsite Agreement and the law under U.S. Code, Title 32 are at odds with the intent of Goldwater-Nichols and Nunn-Cohen, thus causing them to fall short of their strategic objectives to uphold vital command principles within the Department of Defense. Disregarding or circumventing properly envisioned "clear responsibility" and "commensurate authority" belies the logic of Goldwater-Nichols and Nunn-Cohen. This requires a review of the proper roles and missions of the Reserve Component SOF to correct this chain of command and responsibility deficiency. To that end, to satisfy and perpetuate that vision, Special Forces should return to the Army Reserve to restore USSOCOM, USASOC and USASFC(A) command authority in order to empower commanders and provide the resources and flexibility to prosecute war absent of state and political boundaries. Whether or not the decision to realign USACAPOC(A) to USARC goes against Goldwater-Nichols and Nunn-Cohen is a matter of debate that has been and probably still is

underway at DoD and the Pentagon. But on its face it resembles the same decisions that lead to the Offsite Agreement in 1993. With that in mind, consider the benefits to the people of the several states if CA and PSYOP capabilities were included within their National Guard ranks. If SOF is to remain in the ARNG, SOF capabilities should be properly aligned to address natural or manmade emergencies to the benefit of all parties involved. In any event Reserve Component Special Operations will remain a cornerstone within the Special Operations community. One would hope that transformation does not lead to future decisions similar to the ones illustrated here. Whatever the future holds for the Special Operations community, USSOCOM will characteristically maintain its place as the premier unified combatant command. As has always been the case prior to and since 11 September 2001, USSOCOM, USASOC, USASFC(A) and USACAPOC(A) will continue to answer the nation's call in the war on terrorism.

### Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> The President has the authority to mobilize no more than 1,000,000 reservists (units and individuals from all services), for 24 months or less, and the resources needed for their support to meet the requirements of war or other national emergency involving an external threat to national security.

<sup>2</sup> Francis J. Harvey and Peter J. Schoomaker, *A Campaign Quality Army with Joint and Expeditionary Capabilities*, 2006 Posture Statement, United States Army, 25.

<sup>3</sup> Cornell Law School, U.S. Code Collection, Title 32, Chapter 1, Section 104, Units: Location; Organization; Command; available from [http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/uscode32/usc\\_sec\\_32\\_00000104---000-.html](http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/uscode32/usc_sec_32_00000104---000-.html); Internet; accessed 1 January 2007.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> Cornell Law School, U.S. Code Collection, Title 10, Subtitle E, Part I, Chapter 1003, Section 10104, Army Reserve: Composition; available from [http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/10/usc\\_sec\\_10\\_00010104---000-.html](http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/10/usc_sec_10_00010104---000-.html); Internet; accessed 1 January 2007.

<sup>6</sup> James R. Locher III, "The Goldwater-Nichols Act: Ten Years Later," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Autumn 1996: available from [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq\\_pubs/0513.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/0513.pdf); Internet: accessed 29 December 2006, 10.

<sup>7</sup> "The History of the 10<sup>th</sup> Special Forces Group (Airborne)," May 2001, linked from *HQ USASOC Special Forces Command Home Page* at 10<sup>th</sup> Special Forces Group, available from <http://www.soc.mil/SF/history.pdf>; Internet; accessed 29 December 2006.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> Title 10, Subtitle A, Part I, Chapter 6, § 161 states "With the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the President, through the Secretary of Defense, shall establish under section 161 of this title a unified combatant command for special operations forces. The principal function of the command is to prepare special operations forces to carry out assigned missions."

<sup>13</sup> Brian Boquist, "Asymmetrical Attack on America & Possible Responses," 17 September 2001; available from <http://www.landfield.com/isn/mail-archive/2001/Sep/0115.html>; Internet; accessed 30 December 2006.

<sup>14</sup> I attended the 19<sup>th</sup> SFG (A) 1994 YTC as a representative of G3, U.S. Army Special Command (Airborne). BG Davidson made this announcement as an introduction to the conference.

<sup>15</sup> FY 1995 DAHSUM, Chapter 5: Reserve Force. "Secretary of Defense [Les Aspin] announced, in December 1993, a major restructuring plan for the Army's reserve components. Senior leaders of the active Army, ARNG, USAR, and the associations representing each component's members had worked out an agreement that modified the reserve components' missions. In addition to its traditional state and civil missions, the ARNG generally would be oriented toward combat functions, and the USAR would be generally oriented toward combat service support functions. Under the terms of the agreement, most USAR aviation assets will transfer to the ARNG; some ARNG combat support and combat service support units will transfer to the USAR components. Overall, the agreement will switch 128 units containing 11,062 authorizations from the ARNG to the USAR, and 44 units containing 14,049 authorizations from the USAR to the ARNG. This transfer began in FY 1994 with the ARNG receiving responsibility for all reserve component Special Forces units, and continued during FY 1995 with the transfer of more than 8,000 positions between the ARNG and the USAR."; available from <http://www.army.mil/CMH/books/DAHSUM/1995/ch05.htm>; Internet; accessed 27 January 2007.

<sup>16</sup> Example, the state of Utah or Colorado may have little or no interests associated with invading a foreign country and therefore reject mobilization of its ARNG forces and/or soldiers.

<sup>17</sup> State Troop Commands are not USSF like-type commands and are not familiar with USAJFKSWCS training, doctrine and standards.

<sup>18</sup> Locher, 11.

<sup>19</sup> Locher, 13

<sup>20</sup> National Security Act of 1947, linked from The U.S. Department of State Home Page, available from <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/cwr/17603.htm>; Internet; accessed 30 December 2006.

<sup>21</sup> Barrett, Archie D., Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, "Empowering Eisenhower's Concept"; sub-article to "The Goldwater-Nichols

Act: Ten Years Later," Joint Forces Quarterly, Autumn 1996: available from [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq\\_pubs/0513.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/0513.pdf); Internet; accessed 29 December 2006, 13.

<sup>22</sup> The 1949 and 1953 amendment of the National Security Act of 1947 (61 Stat. 496) established an independent agency to advise the President on the coordination of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security. It transferred effective August 20, 1949 to the Executive Office of the President by Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1949, with membership consisting of the President; the Secretaries of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board (NSRB); and additional members at the President's discretion. NSC statutory membership transferred from Director of NSRB to Director of ODM, by Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1953, effective June 12, 1953. The National Archives, *Guide to Federal Records*; available from <http://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/273.html>; Internet; accessed 28 January 2007.

<sup>23</sup> Barrett.

<sup>24</sup> Barrett.

<sup>25</sup> The objectives of the Nunn-Cohen Amendment were to 1) provide close civilian oversight for special operations and low-intensity conflict activities, 2) ensure that genuine expertise and a diversity of views are available to the President and the SECDEF regarding special operations requirements and low-intensity threats, 3) improve interagency planning and coordination for special operations and low-intensity conflict, and 4) bolster special operations capabilities in such areas as joint doctrine and training, intelligence support, command and control, budgetary authority, personnel management and mission planning. Brown, Bryan D., Commanding General, USSOCOM, "U.S. Special Operations Command: Meeting the Challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century," Joint Forces Quarterly, 1<sup>st</sup> Quarter 2006: available from [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq\\_pubs/4008.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/4008.pdf); accessed 28 January 2007.

<sup>26</sup> Global Security, Military, U.S. Special Operations Command, available from <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/socom.htm>; Internet; accessed 9 October 2006.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> U.S. Army Special Operations Command, available from [http://www.soc.mil/hqs/hqs\\_home.htm](http://www.soc.mil/hqs/hqs_home.htm); Internet; accessed 9 October 2006.

<sup>29</sup> Locher, 12

<sup>30</sup> Locher.

<sup>31</sup> Locher.

<sup>32</sup> Locher, 13.

<sup>33</sup> Locher.

<sup>34</sup> Locher.

<sup>35</sup> Locher.

<sup>36</sup> Aspin, Les, Secretary of Defense, "Report on the BOTTOM-UP REVIEW", October 1993; available from <http://www.fas.org/man/docs/bur/part01.htm>; Internet; accessed 6 January 2007.

<sup>37</sup> In planning the force structure and allocating resources, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin established force levels and support objectives that were designed to win one MRC across a range of likely conflicts. His detailed analyses of possible future MRCs, coupled with military judgment as to the outcomes, suggested that the following forces would be adequate to execute the strategy for a single MRC: 4 - 5 Army divisions; 4 - 5 Marine Expeditionary Brigades; 10 Air Force fighter wings; 100 Air Force heavy bombers; 4 - 5 Navy aircraft carrier battle groups; and Special Operations forces.

<sup>38</sup> Correll, John T., "The Bottom-Down Review", *Air Force Magazine Online*, December 1993 Vol.76, No. 12; available from <http://www.afa.org/magazine/1993/12edit93.asp>; Internet; accessed 6 January 2007.

<sup>39</sup> "At a senior level Army Off-Site in February of 1993, an historic agreement was made to provide long term stability for the force. The agreement set a course for Army Reserve component force structure for FY 99, based on the tenets of the Bottom-Up Review. The Army National Guard continued to restructure to ensure a balanced combat, combat support, and combat service support force. The Army National Guard developed a plan of force structure reductions and realignments to achieve the targeted force structure of 405,000 by the end of FY 98 (-11,000). The Army Reserve reorganized USAR training units consistent with the Army's Total Army Training Study recommendations (-3,500). The focus was to emphasize unit training and exercises which supported increased peacetime readiness and reduced training time prior to deployment. The USAR completed its transition to the structure agreed to in the February 1993 Off-Site." FY 96 Reserve Reduction Plan by Component, available from <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/reduction/report3.html>; Internet; accessed 28 January 2007

<sup>40</sup> Chapter 5, Reserve Forces – 1994 DAHSUM, Department of the Army Historical Summary: FY 1994, available from [www.army.mil/CMH/books/DAHSUM/1994/ch05.htm](http://www.army.mil/CMH/books/DAHSUM/1994/ch05.htm); Internet; accessed 28 December 2006.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

<sup>44</sup> USASOC PAO, USACAPOC Realigns from USASOC to USARC, 23 May 2006; available from <http://news.soc.mil/releases/06%20MAY/060523-01.html>; Internet; accessed 8 October 2006.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid.

<sup>46</sup> Army Reserve, Command Structure, United States Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command, History; available from [http://www.armyreserve.army.mil/ARMYDRA/USACAPOC/USACAPOC\\_History.htm](http://www.armyreserve.army.mil/ARMYDRA/USACAPOC/USACAPOC_History.htm); Internet; accessed 9 October 2006.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid.

<sup>48</sup> USACAPOC (A) Mission/Vision, 14 October 2006, linked from *USACAPOC (A)* Homepage available from <http://www.samhouston.army.mil/usacapoc/Mission.aspx>; Internet; accessed 14 October 2006.

<sup>49</sup> Jeff McKaughan, ISOF Warrior, 7 June 2005, linked from *Special Operations Technology Online Archives Homepage*, available from <http://www.special-operations-technology.com/article.cfm?DocID=974>; Internet; accessed 14 October 2006.

<sup>50</sup> CAPOC to USAR, 12 April 2006, linked from *Special Operations Technology Online Archives Homepage*, available from <http://www.special-operations-technology.com/article.cfm?DocID=1480>; Internet; accessed 14 October 2006.

<sup>51</sup> Wormuth, Christine, "A Study: 'The Future of the National Guard and Reserves'," *ROA National Security Report* September 2006: 49.

<sup>52</sup> Wormuth, 50.

<sup>53</sup> Wormuth, 51.

<sup>54</sup> Wormuth, 50.

<sup>55</sup> Wormuth.